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Abstract 
This paper studies pension insecurity in a sample of non-retired individuals aged 50 years or older from 18 
European countries. We capture pension insecurity with the subjective expectations on the probability that 
the government will reduce the pensions of the individual before retirement or will increase the statutory 
retirement age. We argue that changes in economic conditions and policy affect the formation of such 
probabilities, and through this, subjective wellbeing. In particular, we study the effects of pension insecurity 
on subjective wellbeing with pooled linear models, regressions per quintiles and instrumental variables. We 
find a statistically significant, stable and negative association between pension insecurity and subjective 
wellbeing. Our findings reveal that the individuals who are more affected by pension insecurity are those 
who are further away from their retirement, have lower income, assess their life survival as low, have higher 
cognitive abilities and do not expect private pension payments. 
Introduction 
There is a flourishing literature aimed at better understanding and measuring economic insecurity. The 
precise concept of economic insecurity has not been agreed upon, and policy discussions use different 
definitions and methods to measure it. The influential report on social progress by Stiglitz et al. (2009) 
defined economic insecurity as uncertainty about the material conditions that may prevail in the future, 
which may generate stress and anxiety. In a more general definition, Bossert and D'Ambrosio (2013: 1018) 
define economic insecurity as ‘the anxiety produced by the possible exposure to adverse economic events 
and by the anticipation of the difficulty to recover from them'. These authors look at the economic insecurity 
experienced at the individual level instead of any demographic group or country level as is usual in the 
policy debates. In this paper, we also look at individual insecurity and focus our attention on a rather 
unexplored dimension: pension insecurity. We attempt to capture pension insecurity based on perceived 
probability that the government will reduce the generosity of pensions of the individual before retirement or 
will increase the statutory retirement age. The idea behind this is that the individual who is at an advanced 
stage of the life-cycle will not have enough time to adequately respond to an adverse policy change in 
pension regulations (e.g. by increasing savings), which will cause worry and stress. The reduction of future 
pensions involves a lower level of consumption and living standards, while the obligation to work extra years 
means a decrease in leisure. Given that present consumption is more valuable than future consumption 
from the individual's view, a rise in the statutory age of retirement may cause a loss of wellbeing. Our 
hypothesis is that the probability of losing future consumption and/or leisure due to a change in rules will 
cause a deterioration in the wellbeing of the individuals who are approaching retirement. 
The data used for the empirical analysis are the second and fourth wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing 
and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) which correspond to 2007 and 2011, i.e. the years before and after the 
economic crisis. Indeed, this paper is motivated by the patterns depicted in Figures 1a and 1b. These 
figures show a sharp difference in pension insecurity before and after the economic crisis. The distribution 
of the subjective probability that the government will adversely affect pension rights clearly indicates higher 
pension insecurity in 2011 than in 2007. 
The variation of pension insecurity during the period of analysis offers the opportunity to study the 
relationship between pension insecurity and subjective wellbeing. We argue that changes in economic 
conditions affect the formation of subjective probabilities about the response of the government regarding 
pension rules in the future and, through this channel, subjective wellbeing. It is expected that policies 
implemented after the economic crisis, such as budget cuts on social expenditures and reduction of safety 
nets, will also trigger the belief that the government will go further with its austerity measures and will 
reduce pensions and/or delay retirement. A decrease in pensions can weaken the efforts to fight poverty in 
old age because pension income represents a large share of total old age income and significantly reduces 
poverty and income inequality (Marx et al., 2015). This view is also perceived by European citizens. Results 
from the opinion survey Eurobarometer (European Commission, 2012) report a large share (57 per cent) of 
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Europeans worrying that their income in old age will be insufficient to live in dignity. This share increased from 50 per cent in July 2009 to 57 per cent in December 2011 
in the EU-27, and shows notable differences by country. 
For example, in Greece, Italy and Portugal, the concern about old age income rose from 60-62 per cent to 75-80 per cent between 2009 and 2011, while in Austria, 
Finland and the Netherlands, it increased from 28-32 per cent to 3637 per cent. This paper attempts to improve the understanding of the effects of pension insecurity and 
allow policy makers to better recognize and understand the demand of pension policies in their countries and offer better policy responses. 
We study the relationship between pension insecurity and life satisfaction, which is a widely used measure of subjective wellbeing (Krueger and Schkade, 2008) by 
means of linear regression models (OLS), quintile regressions and Instrumental Variables (IV). Our results indicate a statistically significant, stable and negative 
association between pension insecurity and life satisfaction. The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides a background on subjective wellbeing and 
pension reforms in Europe. Section 3 presents the data and methods. Section 4 presents and discusses the results. Finally, section 5 provides a conclusion. 
 
Figure 1. (Colour online) (a) Predicted probability that the government will increase the retirement age in the future; (b) Predicted probability that the government will reduce pensions in the 
future 
Source: SHARE’s waves 2 and 4. 
Note: The ﬁgures represent Kernel distributions (bw=0.1) of predicted probabilities for respondents surveyed in waves 2 and 4 of SHARE. The predicted values are estimated with pooled 
OLS regressions that control by age, sex, years of education and dummies of countries, years and their interactions.
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Background 
Pension reforms and the economic crisis 
In the course of the 2008 economic crisis, governments recorded a sharp increase of public budget deficits 
due to reduced tax revenues and increased spending on unemployed and inactive individuals (OECD, 
2014). As a result, many European countries were under pressure to enact budget cuts on social 
expenditure and increase taxes or contributions to social protection systems. The sustainability of pension 
systems is challenged by demographic change and had been therefore under scrutiny even before the 
crisis. Increased life expectancy and lower fertility rates led to more pensioners, but fewer contributors. The 
upcoming retirement of the baby-boomer cohorts will aggravate this development. Additionally, past cohorts 
entered retirement under favourable conditions, which allowed them to exit the labour market quite early 
without high deductions. 
The economic crisis accelerated the need to implement pension policy reforms as quickly as possible since 
pensions represent a large share of social security spending. In most European countries, austerity 
measures included the increase of early and normal retirement ages (see Table A1 of the Appendix). In 
other countries, reforms were already on the agenda and reform planning was accelerated (e.g. Germany 
and Netherlands). In several countries, early retirement schemes were abolished or suspended before or in 
the course of the crisis (Denmark, Netherlands, Poland, Ireland and Portugal). Furthermore, the pension 
model simulations from the OECD, which include the most recent changes in pension rules, indicated a 
deterioration of pension replacement rates in several countries (OECD, 2007; OECD, 2013). Figure 2 
shows the magnitude of these changes between 2006 and 2012. For example, Greece is the country that 
has experienced the greatest fall in the pension replacement rate, with a decrease of about 30 per cent 
during this time. 
Policy changes due to the crisis often did not correspond to the country's welfare regimes or to partisan 
politics (Starke et al., 2014; Shahidi, 2015). Rather, the reactions of the governments were dependent on 
the particular national impact of the economic crisis and the already established generosity of the welfare 
state. No straightforward pattern of expansion or retrenchment was found to be visible. 
 
Figure 2. (Colour online) Net pension replacement rates  
Sources: OECD (2007) and OECD (2013). 
Most of the pension measures have been introduced to maintain financial sustainability, but sometimes this 
means a loss of income adequacy in old age provisions (OECD, 2014). Among other European countries, 
especially in Eastern Europe, the third pillar (voluntary pension plans) was reinforced after the recession to 
overcome funding gaps in transitional systems like the Pay-As-You-Go system (Drahokoupil and 
Domonkos, 2012). The same applies for South European countries (Natali and Stamati, 2014). The 
reinforcement of private pensions (compulsory occupational plans or voluntary third pillar plans) is not 
necessarily fostering inequality in old age (Ebbinghaus and Neugschwender, 2011). However, persons at 
risk of old age poverty are those with a non-standard employment career, low-income households and 
women, as they might not be able to accumulate resources and invest in private pensions or other ways of 
savings. Furthermore, while younger cohorts have more time to adapt to new pension systems and/or 
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accumulate other types of savings, individuals that will retire in the foreseeable future are at risk of needing 
to work longer or receive lower pensions. 
Pension plans and subjective wellbeing 
Next to policy changes, the economic crisis also affected individual retirement behaviour. Studies based on 
the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) find differences in retirement behaviour, namely postponing 
retirement and working longer (Szinovacz et al., 2014; Hurd and Rohwedder, 2011). Parker et al. (2013) 
report that expecting lower pension benefits is associated with plans to retire later instead of opting for early 
retirement. Interestingly, this last paper relates pension plan decisions to the level of individual cognitive 
abilities and finds that individuals with better cognitive abilities tend to retire later. Contrary to these studies, 
Munnell and Rutledge (2013) report that more senior workers were laid off in the 2008 economic crisis and 
subsequent Great Recession than in previous recessions, and many of them accelerated their retirement. In 
the case of Europe, the analysis of the SHARE dataset reveals that the economic crisis is associated with a 
lower likelihood of retirement of the European older workers (Meschi et al., 2013) and a deterioration of 
health (Bucher-Koenen and Mazzonna, 2013). Meschi et al. (2013) show that the direct transition from 
unemployment to retirement increased notably after the crisis. 
Changes in pension regulations may have visible and strong effects on middle age workers. For example, 
considering the 2006 Dutch pension reform as a natural experiment and exploiting the exogenous variation 
of changes in pension rights for some cohorts, some studies present robust evidence for strong and 
negative effects of regulatory changes on job satisfaction and mental health (De Grip et al., 2012; 
Montizaan and Vendrik, 2014). Also in the US, deviation from the expected retirement plans shows negative 
effects for subjective well-being (Falba et al., 2009; Clarke et al., 2012). 
All these findings suggest that older workers have revised or are in the process of revising their retirement 
plans. It seems clear that the economic crisis has prompted a reduction in pension generosity. It could also 
be the case that changes in pension policies are not yet in place in some countries, but the individuals are 
anticipating the implementation of public policies that will cut old age expenditures. In any case, the 
evidence presented above is clear about the negative effects of changes in retirement plans on the 
wellbeing of older workers. In general, different forms of economic insecurity have a negative effect on 
subjective wellbeing. In this regard, job insecurity is a well-studied type of economic insecurity. It has been 
found that job insecurity leads to lower life satisfaction (Carr and Chung, 2014; Silla et al., 2009), lower job 
satisfaction (Artz and Kaya, 2014; Lange, 2013), more mental health complaints (Hellgren and Sverke, 
2003; Modrek et al., 2015; László et al., 2010) and more depression (Burgard et al., 2012; Meltzer et al., 
2010). Although some studies analyse the effects of changes in pension regulations, there is a lack of 
research on pension insecurity and its effects on the wellbeing of older workers. By tackling this question, 
our study contributes to the literature of economic insecurity and subjective wellbeing. 
Regarding the effects of changes of macro variables on subjective wellbeing, Deaton (2012) has 
documented that life satisfaction in the US was closely related to the evolution of stock market indices 
during and after the economic crisis. This was particularly significant for individuals close to retirement and 
participating in funded pension systems because the crisis affected their expected old age income. Hershey 
et al. (2010) found that income inequality and a higher expected old age dependency ratio are associated 
with more worries about retirement income in Europe. Lübke and Erlinghagen (2014) show for 19 European 
countries that individual job insecurity is related to economic situation and country specific context. In 
Europe, macro fluctuations can also affect the confidence of the individuals in the future of their pensions. 
Figures 3a-3d show a high correlation between changes (before and after the crisis) in relevant macro 
outcomes and changes in perceptions about confidence in the future of pensions in the country. For 
example, those countries where the decrease in employment growth rate was larger also experienced a 
larger increase in the variation of the share of individuals that reported being unconfident about the future of 
their pensions1.
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Figure 3. (Colour online) (a) Unconﬁdent about the future of pensions and GDP growth rate (variation 2006-2009); (b) 
Unconﬁdent about the future of pensions and employment growth rate (variation 2006–2009); (c) Unconﬁdent about the 
future of pensions and public debt to GDP ratio (variation 2006-2009); (d) Unconﬁdent about the future of pensions and 
long-term interest rate on gov. bond (variation 2006-2009) Source: Eurobarometer 66.3 and 71.3 for subjective variables 
and Eurostat for the macro variables. 
Note: The y-axis reports the difference in the percentage of individuals (50+ and non-retired) that has no conﬁdence (not 
very conﬁdent or not at all conﬁdent) about the future of their pensions between 2006 and 2009 for each country. The 
question used from the Eurobarometer is: ‘At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, would you say 
that you are . . . ? very conﬁdent / somewhat conﬁdent / not very conﬁdent / not at all conﬁdent’. The x-axis reports the 
percentage differences in the macro variables between 2006 and 2009 for each country. 
Data and methods 
The data 
We use the second and fourth wave of the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe2. This 
dataset is composed of nationally representative samples of individuals aged 50 and over with comparable 
information. Our sample is composed of 15,389 individuals who are not yet retired in 18 European countries 
(Austria, Germany, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland). Wave 2 was collected in 
2006/2007 and wave 4 in 2011/2012. Even though some countries have longitudinal data in SHARE, this 
feature cannot be exploited because pension insecurity is asked only during the first wave of participation. 
The analytical sample therefore includes a single observation for each individual, taken from either the wave 
2 or 4 of SHARE. 
Variables 
As we are interested in finding the predictors of life satisfaction, the dependent variable employed in our 
regression analysis is drawn from the question ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means completely 
dissatisfied and 10 means completely satisfied, how satisfied are you with your life?'. The variables age, 
sex, married or living with a partner and years of education control for socio-demographic background. The 
number of diagnosed chronic diseases is a proxy for health. Economic variables are income, a dummy 
indicating whether a person is currently employed or not, and home ownership. The income corresponds to 
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the log of reported household net income equivalised with the square root of the number of members in the 
household and adjusted by purchasing power parity and prices of the year 2011. Home ownership is 
included as a proxy for wealth. 
Pension insecurity is captured with the questions ‘What are the chances that before you retire the 
government will reduce the pension which you are entitled to?' and ‘What are the chances that before you 
retire the government will raise your retirement age?' In both questions, the individual must indicate a 
number between 0 and 100. We argue that these items can capture pension insecurity because they 
involve notions that emphasise the aspect of stress/anxiety due to uncertainty about economic conditions in 
the future and potential loss. The literature about insecurity stresses also the aspects of loss and threat, 
which generate insecurity (Gallie et al., 2016; Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984). While our items are not 
asking about the feeling of insecurity directly, the first item measures an expectation of a potential loss of 
pension. A reduction in pension is certainly connected to the worry of economic hardship in the future. The 
second item measures a threat to expectations for retirement planning and a loss of leisure. The increase of 
the age of retirement may reduce the economic wellbeing of the individual because individuals value 
present consumption more than future consumption. It addresses more the threat perception and the 
powerlessness to counteract it, since the increase of retirement age cannot be influenced by the individual. 
As pension insecurity is a fairly new topic in the literature of insecurity, we are adjusting already established 
concepts to our data. 
As insecurity is a multidimensional concept, more than one variable is needed to grasp the variation in 
insecurity (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984). The aggregation of different dimensions into a joint indicator 
of insecurity is a standard practice in job insecurity research (Gallie et al., 2016; Hellgren and Sverke, 2003; 
Silla et al., 2009). In the case of pension insecurity, we perform a principal component analysis of both 
mentioned items and predict the first component (explain 74.5 per cent of the variance) as a single latent 
factor that represents the perceived difficulties of the future regarding a safe and steady pension provision. 
We labelled this variable pension insecurity3. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of the assessed 
variables. 
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Range Mean SD 
life satisfaction 0 to 10 7.821 1.583 
chance of pension reduction 0 to 1 0.472 0.352 
chance of retirement age increase 0 to 1 0.489 0.372 
pension insecurity 0 to 1 0.480 0.312 
years of education 0 to 25 12.060 4.193 
age 50 to 75 56.229 4.320 
chronic diseases 0 to 8 1.109 1.198 
log of equivalised household income -7.537 to 8.652 3.080 1.120 
 Percentage   
male (0/l) 49.5   
married or living with partner (0/l) 80.8   
working (0/l) 88.3   
home ownership (0/l) 77.0   
N  15,389  
Empirical strategy 
We run OLS regression models with the pooled data of SHARE. The main specification is as follows: 
ict = 0 + 1Xict + 2Zict + c + t + Xct + ict    (l) 
The left-hand side variable yict indicates individual life satisfaction. The subscripts i, c and t represent the 
individual, country and year, respectively. Xict is our variable of interest and measures pension insecurity as 
defined above. The set of variables included in Zict are controls typically used in the empirical literature of 
life satisfaction. We include dummies for countries, years and their interactions in order to control for 
country specific effects, general time trends, and country-year specific effects. All variables, except 
dummies, are previously standardised with mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one. Note 
that our results must be interpreted as associations instead of causality from pension insecurity to life 
satisfaction, although we will enrich our analysis by breaking down the model equations by quintiles of 
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different and relevant variables. 
Further, we use another measure of subjective wellbeing available in SHARE. This is a form of eudemonic 
wellbeing that measures overall quality of life and is captured with the instrument CASP-12 (Control, 
Autonomy, Self-realisation, Pleasure, see Hyde et al., 2003, and Wiggins et al., 2004). Individuals answer 
how often they experience 12 different feelings and situations on a 4-point scale. A higher score means a 
better level of subjective wellbeing. Not surprisingly, the correlation of CASP-12 with life satisfaction is high 
at 0.55. 
In a last step, we employ an instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the potential endogeneity of 
insecurity and subjective wellbeing. The use of IV can mitigate the problems of omitted variable bias, 
reverse causality and measurement error. For example, individuals who report low subjective wellbeing can 
also be more prone to express pessimistic views about the future and, hence, are more likely to report a 
high probability that the government will reduce the generosity of their pensions. Given the availability of 
certain administrative information that is exogenous to subjective wellbeing, we can perform IV regressions 
and explore the robustness of the effect of pension insecurity on subjective wellbeing. One of the 
instruments will be a variable equal to the statutory retirement age specific to the country, year and sex (see 
Table A1 of the Appendix) minus the age of the individual. We rely on these variations as a valid instrument 
for pension insecurity. We expect that the individuals whose age is more distant from the statutory 
retirement age will feel more pension insecurity. The reason is that this variable is a proxy for a situation in 
which the statutory age has increased thus extending the length of time to work before retirement. Another 
IV is the government net lending position over GDP which indicates the amount of financial assets available 
for lending (if positive) or borrowing (if negative) to finance the government expenditures that are in excess 
of revenues. A high deficit will indicate problems with the sustainability of public finances. This variable was 
extracted from the OECD and is country and year specific. We expect that pension insecurity is negatively 
correlated with net lending position. 
While we tried to control for endogeneity of life satisfaction and the subjective measures of insecurity, we 
cannot rule out a selection bias concerning the sample. As we studied only individuals aged 50 and older, 
there might be a selection of those that stayed in the labour market. Persons who already left the labour 
market due to early retirement are not identifiable. Hence, the relation of insecurity and life satisfaction 
could be even stronger and our results have to be interpreted at a lower bound estimate. 
TABLE 2. OLS estimates of life satisfaction 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
male 0.0036 0.0029 0.0043 
 (0.0262) (0.0265) (0.0264) 
married or living with partner 0.3571*** 0.3572*** 0.3566*** 
 (0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0253) 
working 0.2737*** 0.2719*** 0.2734*** 
 (0.0465) (0.0467) (0.0465) 
years of education 0.0505*** 0.0492*** 0.0500*** 
 (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0160) 
age 0.0472*** 0.0530*** 0.0443*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0102) (0.0106) 
chronic diseases -0.1293*** -0.1304*** -0.1296*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0152) (0.0152) 
log of equivalised household 
income 0.0638
*** 0.0645*** 0.0641*** 
 (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0131) 
home ownership 0.1432*** 0.1422*** 0.1425*** 
 (0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0282) 
chance of pension reduction -0.0551
*** 
(0.0142)   
chance of retirement age increase  -0.0256
** 
(0.0114)  
pension insecurity   -0.0497*** 
   (0.0119) 
constant -0.7735*** -0.7852*** -0.7837*** 
 (0.0464) (0.0471) (0.0463) 
N 15,389 15,389 15,389 
R2 0.174 0.172 0.173 
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All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Results 
Main results 
The main results of the estimates for life satisfaction are shown in Table 2. Note that the third column 
includes our variable of interest, i.e. the latent variable of pension insecurity4. In general, the covariates of 
each model show the usual associations with life satisfaction. Income is positively associated with life 
satisfaction. Approximately, the increase of one standard deviation (SD) in the log of income is associated 
with an increase of 0.06 SD in life satisfaction. Similarly, wealthier individuals – proxied by home ownership 
– show more satisfaction with life. One SD increase of age or educational attainment increases life 
satisfaction by 0.05 SD. By contrast, being affected by more chronic diseases is associated with less life 
satisfaction. There is a decrease of about 0.13 SD in life satisfaction for each SD increase in the number of 
diseases. Being employed shows a significant association with life satisfaction. Transiting from 
unemployment or inactivity to employment can increase life satisfaction by 0.27 SD. Being married or living 
with a partner notably increases life satisfaction by about 0.36 SD. The results show that the relationship 
between pension insecurity and life satisfaction is negative and significant: an increase of one SD in 
pension insecurity is associated with a reduction of 0.05 SD in life satisfaction. 
Results by quintiles 
Generally, pension reforms are targeted at individuals who are not too close to retirement age in order to 
avoid a drastic reduction of pension rights and minimise social and political opposition. If this holds, then we 
can expect differential effects of pension insecurity on life satisfaction depending on how far the individual is 
from retirement age. As a consequence, individuals whose age is nearer to retirement age can feel more 
confident that they will not be affected by regulatory changes, while younger individuals may feel more 
worried. Depending on the institutional and economic conditions of the country, it is also plausible that the 
close-to-retirement individuals may experience insecurity about their future pensions because they will not 
have enough time to adjust their savings to keep a desirable living standard in old age. This is particularly 
relevant in countries where retirement at legal age is compulsory, and labour beyond retirement is heavily 
taxed or not permitted. Furthermore, we can expect that younger individuals will be less concerned with 
pension changes because either they have time to adjust their savings and labour decisions or they are 
myopic about the future. In any case, these conjectures can only be valued empirically. 
Table 3 shows the life satisfaction estimates of models resulting from categorising the sample by quintiles of 
years to reach retirement age5. Once the individuals are categorised into quintiles of these years, we run 
the same main model regression for each quintile and report the results in Table 3.The first column 
corresponds to the individuals who are closer to retirement (average age is 60.7 years) while the last 
column corresponds to the individuals for whom retirement will occur later (average age is 51.6 years). We 
observe that pension insecurity is statistically significant and negatively related to life satisfaction for every 
quintile except for the oldest quintile. Individuals of the third quintile are 55.2 years old on average and show 
the biggest association between pension insecurity and life satisfaction: an increase of one SD in pension 
insecurity is associated with a reduction of 0.063 SD in life satisfaction. As we postulated earlier, it is 
possible that the individuals who are very near to retirement are not affected by pension insecurity because 
the changes in pension regulations are not intended for them. Changes in age eligibility and replacement 
rates are in general aimed at workers that are not too close to statutory retirement ages. This is why we 
observe a larger effect of pension insecurity on life satisfaction among the younger individuals. Because 
economic resources can protect individuals from unexpected pension regulatory changes and allow them to 
absorb large fluctuations of consumption in old age, we expect to find a lower effect of pension insecurity on 
life satisfaction for wealthier individuals. The regressions presented in Table 4 correspond to samples of 
individuals categorised in income quintiles. In all groups, pension insecurity is negatively associated with life 
satisfaction, with the effect being largest in the poorest quintile. An increase of one SD of pension insecurity 
in the poorest and richest quintile is associated with a reduction of 0.073 SD and 0.03 SD in life satisfaction, 
respectively. Pension insecurity has a greater effect on the subjective wellbeing of the poor. Therefore, our 
results provide evidence for another vehicle of the negative effects of the 2008 economic crisis on 
subjective wellbeing outcomes. 
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TABLE 3. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per years to reach retirement quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
     furthest 
 closest to    from 
Variables retirement 2nd 3rd 4th retirement 
Male 0.0175 -0.0598 0.0350 0.0200 0.0147 
 (0.0250) (0.0553) (0.0377) (0.0462) (0.0538) 
married or living with 0.3197*** 0.4124*** 0.3869*** 0.3358*** 0.3895*** 
partner (0.0337) (0.0595) (0.0390) (0.0460) (0.0356) 
working 0.2052** 0.2793*** 0.2246*** 0.4832***  
 (0.0846) (0.0863) (0.0577) (0.0820)  
years of education 0.0328 0.0647** 0.0212 0.0872*** 0.0429** 
 (0.0261) (0.0260) (0.0262) (0.0211) (0.0188) 
Age 0.0736 0.0652 0.0572 -0.0758 0.0950 
 (0.0607) (0.0626) (0.0536) (0.0638) (0.0621) 
chronic diseases -0.1447*** -0.1432*** -0.1489*** -0.1150*** -0.1008*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0184) (0.0253) (0.0202) (0.0230) 
log of equivalised 0.0478 0.0581** 0.0546* 0.0733*** 0.0873** 
household income (0.0375) (0.0238) (0.0267) (0.0154) (0.0352) 
home ownership 0.1450** 0.1928*** 0.0965** 0.0953 0.2242*** 
 (0.0574) (0.0448) (0.0431) (0.0613) (0.0625) 
pension insecurity -0.0219 -0.0600** -0.0627*** -0.0491* -0.0404** 
 (0.0183) (0.0228) (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0179) 
constant -0.8015*** -0.4231*** -0.6813*** -0.5503*** -1.6180*** 
 (0.0818) (0.0727) (0.0473) (0.1213) (0.0975) 
N 2,937 2,970 2,937 2,864 2,902 
R2 0.191 0.197 0.190 0.180 0.195 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
TABLE 4. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per income quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 poorest    richest 
Variables quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile 
male 0.0309 0.0366 -0.0275 0.0197 0.0173 
 (0.0593) (0.0343) (0.0277) (0.0380) (0.0310) 
married or living with 0.3837*** 0.2647*** 0.2626*** 0.3472*** 0.3407*** 
partner (0.1057) (0.0398) (0.0393) (0.0496) (0.0409) 
working 0.4172*** 0.1769** 0.2317*** 0.0674 0.1966*** 
 (0.0492) (0.0641) (0.0779) (0.0606) (0.0616) 
years of education 0.0968*** 0.0042 0.0063 0.0102 0.0492** 
 (0.0259) (0.0187) (0.0234) (0.0286) (0.0197) 
age 0.0531* 0.0586*** 0.0709*** 0.0181 0.0024 
 (0.0265) (0.0189) (0.0226) (0.0197) (0.0184) 
chronic diseases -0.1403*** -0.1636*** -0.1049*** -0.0887*** -0.1139*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0282) (0.0161) (0.0232) (0.0277) 
log of equivalised 0.0607* 0.4359*** 0.4734* 0.2766** -0.0195 
household income (0.0324) (0.1377) (0.2294) (0.1123) (0.0180) 
home ownership 0.1364** 0.1557*** 0.0886* 0.1298*** 0.1338*** 
 (0.0498) (0.0444) (0.0485) (0.0296) (0.0318) 
pension insecurity -0.0729* -0.0480** -0.0558** -0.0283 -0.0298* 
 (0.0357) (0.0190) (0.0217) (0.0219) (0.0144) 
constant -0.2937** -0.7881*** -0.0887 -0.8327*** -1.0535*** 
 (0.1250) (0.1093) (0.0697) (0.0482) (0.0738) 
N 3,079 3,079 3,082 3,081 3,068 
R2 0.122 0.132 0.124 0.136 0.183 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
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and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
It has been shown that expectations about how long we will live play a role in retirement and saving 
decisions and have a significant predictive power for mortality (Hurd and McGarry, 2002). In a recent paper 
with HRS data, Parker et al. (2013) report that those individuals expecting to live longer intend to retire later 
as well, which is consistent with the goal of trying to keep a desirable living standard during an extended 
length of life. In Europe, Peracchi and Perotti (2014) find that subjective survival probabilities are higher for 
individuals who are richer, more educated and healthier, which suggests that income and health are 
important in the formation of subjective survival evaluations. Our sample of individuals also answer a 
question intended to capture subjective life survival expectancy: ‘What are the chances that you will live to 
be age 75/80/85/90 ...?' Therefore, we are able to categorise individuals according to quintiles of subjective 
life survival. Respondents who are younger than 65 are asked for their estimated chance of living up to a 
target age of 75, for those aged 65-69 this target age is 80, for those aged 70-74 this target age is 85 and 
so on. In order to take into account the differences in subjective longevity related to age, we divide the 
individual survival expectation by the corresponding official probability, extracted from the Life Tables of 
Eurostat (which are age, sex, year and country specific). This means that the SHARE's subjective survival 
expectation has been normalised to official life tables, which is similar to the procedure used by Parker et al. 
(2013). After this adjustment, we compute quintiles of the subjective probability of survival and run 
regressions for each quintile. 
Table 5 shows the results per quintile of subjective survival. The lowest quintile includes the individuals 
whose beliefs about their survival rates are the smallest. On average, the individuals of this quintile consider 
their survival rate to be only 41 per cent of the official survival rate, while the individuals of the highest 
quintile believe that their survival rate is 36 per cent larger than their corresponding official survival rates. 
Pension insecurity is negatively related to life satisfaction and only significant in the first, third and fourth 
quintile. For the individuals in the lowest quintile, the effect of pension insecurity is considerable. An 
increase of one SD in pension insecurity is associated with a decrease of 0.09 SD in life satisfaction. Not 
surprisingly, the effect of the number of chronic diseases is the largest within this group: an increase of one 
SD in the number of diseases is associated with a decrease of 0.17 SD in life satisfaction. As 
underestimated life expectancy may be closely related to poor health, the results show that pension 
insecurity is more salient for the less healthy individuals. 
Parker et al. (2013) highlight the importance of cognitive abilities on sound decisions about retirement and 
savings. They find that individuals with better cognitive abilities tend to retire later because they are able to 
better understand the negative financial consequences of early retirement on future living standards. 
Furthermore, less cognitively able individuals show more inconsistent retirement decisions, which calls for 
the need to assist with financial planning. Financial literacy is an increasingly important topic in the literature 
that attempts to explain poverty in general, and old age poverty in particular (see e.g. Lusardi and Mitchell, 
2008 and 2014;van Rooijet al., 2012). Banks et al.(2015) have shown that financial literacy in old age can 
lead to obtaining better an nuities in the UK pension system. We construct quintiles of cognitive ability with 
the first component of a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) of four tests of cognitive functioning available 
in SHARE (immediate and delayed memory recall, verbal fluency and numeracy6). 
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TABLE 5. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per subjective life survival quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lowest    highest 
Variables quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile 
male -0.0606* 0.0326 -0.0756* -0.1448*** -0.0402 
 (0.0330) (0.0289) (0.0363) (0.0325) (0.0384) 
married or living with 0.3141*** 0.3685*** 0.4182*** 0.3069*** 0.3765*** 
partner (0.0490) (0.0378) (0.0355) (0.0396) (0.0541) 
working 0.2900*** 0.3394*** 0.2864*** 0.0525 0.2736*** 
 (0.0771) (0.0581) (0.0866) (0.0729) (0.0806) 
years of education 0.0841** 0.0431* 0.0368* 0.0512** 0.0204 
 (0.0323) (0.0208) (0.0182) (0.0199) (0.0239) 
age 0.0545** 0.0382* 0.0365 0.0427** 0.0379** 
 (0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0223) (0.0169) (0.0179) 
chronic diseases -0.1654*** -0.0757*** -0.0922*** -0.0916*** -0.0657*** 
 (0.0208) (0.0185) (0.0220) (0.0225) (0.0202) 
log of equivalised 0.1093*** 0.0029 0.0772** 0.0409** 0.0616** 
household income (0.0272) (0.0142) (0.0328) (0.0180) (0.0251) 
home ownership 0.1731*** 0.1310*** 0.1099** 0.1134*** 0.1338*** 
 (0.0522) (0.0395) (0.0485) (0.0341) (0.0412) 
pension insecurity -0.0852** -0.0208 -0.0401* -0.0604*** -0.0150 
 (0.0334) (0.0215) (0.0222) (0.0173) (0.0151) 
constant -1.6462*** -1.0470*** -0.0937 -0.1445** -0.1728* 
 (0.0651) (0.0539) (0.0912) (0.0609) (0.0895) 
N 3,079 3,079 3,079 3081 3,071 
R2 0.182 0.146 0.204 0.148 0.183 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Table 6 reports the differential effects of pension insecurity by quintile of cognitive ability. 
Pension insecurity is not statistically associated with life satisfaction for the two lowest quintiles of cognitive 
ability but it is a significant predictor for the other quintiles. In addition, the size of the negative association 
between pension insecurity and life satisfaction increases for each quintile. For example, one SD increase 
of pension insecurity is associated with a 0.08 SD decrease in life satisfaction for the individuals in the top 
20 per cent of the cognitive ability distribution, but this effect is not different from zero for those in the bottom 
40 per cent. This finding may suggest that the individuals with higher cognitive abilities are more aware of or 
more able to understand the consequences of changing pension rules on their future sources of old age 
income, and in this way experience a decline in subjective wellbeing. The underestimation of the effects of 
increasing pension insecurity in the group of less cognitively able individuals leaves life satisfaction 
unaffected, but it is at least worrying that these individuals could be taking suboptimal decisions based on 
limited rationality. Bissonette and van Soest (2012) point out that overly optimistic beliefs may lead to under-
saving in pensions. In the same way, our results for the less cognitively able individuals indicate that their 
decisions concerning retirement, pensions, savings and labour could be potentially misguided. Bonsang and 
Dohmen (2015) have found, with SHARE data, that risk aversion increases with age and that age-related 
variation in risk attitude is largely explained by cognitive decline. Therefore, it will be difficult, even for older 
individuals with better cognitive functioning, to fully adapt to the risks involved by the change of pension 
rules. In liberal type countries, like the US and the UK, public pension provisions are usually complemented 
with private and occupational pension plans, while in many of continental European countries the retirees 
mostly receive only public pensions as an old-age income (Christelis et al., 2009). Of course, individuals 
may have other sources of wealth in old age, but some studies suggest that the participation of pension 
wealth within the total wealth of individuals is sizeable. These studies (Frick and Grabka, 2013; Crawford 
and Hood, 2016; Wolff, 2007) roughly define pension wealth as the present value of the expected pension 
streams. For example, Frick and Grabka (2013) show that 57 per cent of the wealth of German retirees 
corresponds to pension wealth, while the rest is mostly composed of housing wealth. For the total 
population, these authors find that 95 per cent and 87 per cent of the wealth of individuals placed, 
respectively, in the fourth and fifth decile of the distribution of wealth corresponds to pension wealth. The 
importance of public pension provision in Europe has also been stressed by the estimation of sizeable 
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crowding-out effects of public pension wealth on household savings (Alessie et al., 2013). 
TABLE 6. OLS estimates of life satisfaction per cognitive score quintiles 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 lowest    highest 
Variables quintile 2nd 3rd 4th quintile 
male 0.1028* 0.0036 -0.0114 0.0218 -0.0263 
 (0.0554) (0.0479) (0.0370) (0.0359) (0.0257) 
married or living with 0.3552*** 0.3304*** 0.3466*** 0.3579*** 0.3672*** 
partner (0.0646) (0.0452) (0.0388) (0.0364) (0.0699) 
working 0.3402*** 0.2898*** 0.1819** 0.1863** 0.1832** 
 (0.0764) (0.0720) (0.0739) (0.0827) (0.0800) 
years of education 0.0184 0.0431 0.0163 0.0544*** 0.0205 
 (0.0246) (0.0255) (0.0194) (0.0180) (0.0226) 
age 0.0392 0.0755** 0.0761*** 0.0482** 0.0011 
 (0.0246) (0.0271) (0.0193) (0.0175) (0.0132) 
chronic diseases -0.1518*** -0.1365*** -0.1079*** -0.0904*** -0.1218*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0172) (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0273) 
log of equivalised 0.1086*** 0.0436* 0.0479** 0.0432** 0.0483** 
household income (0.0246) (0.0223) (0.0197) (0.0176) (0.0178) 
home ownership 0.1988*** 0.1214** 0.1689*** 0.0863* 0.1176* 
 (0.0422) (0.0441) (0.0453) (0.0439) (0.0613) 
pension insecurity -0.0313 -0.0197 -0.0565*** -0.0601** -0.0787*** 
 (0.0245) (0.0291) (0.0158) (0.0211) (0.0205) 
constant -0.5701*** -1.4929*** -2.2795*** 0.1414 -0.3895*** 
 (0.0762) (0.0749) (0.0480) (0.0832) (0.0806) 
N 3,086 3,070 3,076 3,077 3,077 
R2 0.178 0.171 0.167 0.178 0.195 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
TABLE 7. Pooled OLS estimates of life satisfaction per type of pension entitlement 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables public & private only private only public 
male -0.0050 -0.0301 0.0070 
 (0.0273) (0.0953) (0.0349) 
married or living with 0.3121*** 0.1101 0.4281*** 
partner (0.0250) (0.0953) (0.0302) 
working 0.2883*** 0.0000 0.2510*** 
 (0.0820) (.) (0.0398) 
years of education 0.0040 -0.0697 0.0694*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0619) (0.0161) 
age 0.0458** 0.0472 0.0424** 
 (0.0157) (0.0516) (0.0189) 
chronic diseases -0.0742*** -0.1641*** -0.1687*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0511) (0.0202) 
log of equivalised 0.0267* -0.0358 0.0678*** 
household income (0.0136) (0.0464) (0.0151) 
home ownership 0.0661 0.2351** 0.2071*** 
 (0.0385) (0.0824) (0.0410) 
pension insecurity -0.0334*** -0.0071 -0.0733*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0551) (0.0202) 
constant -0.2528*** -1.6729*** -1.0425*** 
 (0.0596) (0.1788) (0.0359) 
N 4573 382 7531 
R2 0.119 0.172 0.182 
All specifications include year and country dummies and their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a 
PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero 
and SD equal to one. Robust clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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TABLE 8. Pension insecurity estimates of eudemonic wellbeing (CASP-12) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable for  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
the quintile Total quintile quintile Quintile quintile quintile 
total -0.0865***      
 (0.0108)      
years to reach  -0.1055*** -0.1066*** -0.0708*** -0.0848*** -0.0642*** 
retirement  (0.0244) (0.0204) (0.0165) (0.0275) (0.0161) 
Income  -0.0886*** -0.0899** -0.1000*** -0.0957*** -0.0451*** 
  (0.0209) (0.0373) (0.0192) (0.0137) (0.0126) 
subjective life  -0.1005*** -0.0573*** -0.0733*** -0.1036*** -0.0717*** 
survival  (0.0346) (0.0140) (0.0135) (0.0164) (0.0176) 
cognitive score  -0.0969*** -0.0718*** -0.0662*** -0.0939*** -0.0995*** 
  (0.0258) (0.0222) (0.0192) (0.0136) (0.0219) 
Each cell represents a different regression of eudemonic wellbeing (CASP-12) and contains the coefficient of pension 
insecurity and its robust clustered (by country) standard error. All specifications include year and country dummies and 
their interactions. Pension insecurity is the first component of a PCA of both chances of pension changes in the future. 
All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Some individuals have other types of savings and pension plans for old age and not only public pensions 
and hence will be less affected by changes in public pension rules. For this reason, we run model 
regressions in samples of individuals who expect private and public pensions, only private pensions, or only 
public pensions (Table 7). The results clearly show that pension insecurity has a larger detrimental effect on 
wellbeing for the individuals who rely only on public pensions, which is about two times the effect in the 
case of individuals who expect both private and public pensions. The table also shows that pension 
insecurity does not play a role in the wellbeing of the individuals that only expect private pensions, which is 
obvious. 
Robustness checks 
Another measure of subjective wellbeing 
In the following, we will implement the same type of regression analysis we performed in the previous 
section but this time we replace the dependent variable of life satisfaction by the CASP-12 variable. Table 8 
summarises the results of these regressions and only reports the coefficients for pension insecurity. 
Each cell of Table 8 represents a different regression and only shows the coefficient of pension insecurity. 
The first column shows a significant and negative effect of pension insecurity on eudemonic wellbeing. One 
SD increase of pension insecurity is associated with a 0.09 SD decrease in the score of eudemonic 
wellbeing, which is even larger than the effect of life satisfaction reported above (i.e. 0.05 SD). Columns 2 to 
6 show the effect of pension insecurity in each quintile of different variables. Different from the results on life 
satisfaction, we observe that the eudemonic wellbeing levels of individuals whose age is closer to retirement 
age are more affected by pension insecurity than those whose age is further from retirement. Similar to 
before, pension insecurity is more salient to explain a deterioration of eudemonic wellbeing in the group of 
poorer individuals than in the group of wealthier individuals. In the case of subjective life survival rate, the 
effect of pension insecurity is stronger for the individuals who believe their subjective survival rate is the 
lowest. The results obtained for the quintiles of cognition do not show a consistent pattern between pension 
insecurity and eudemonic wellbeing.
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TABLE 9. Instrumental variables of subjective wellbeing 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 
 pension Life pension eudemonic 
Variables insecurity satisfaction insecurity wellbeing 
pension insecurity  -0.1875***  -0.1623*** 
  (0.0253)  (0.0214) 
male -0.0434 0.0118 -0.0434 -0.0061 
 (0.0265) (0.0236) (0.0265) (0.0228) 
married or living with -0.0258 0.3556*** -0.0258 0.1339*** 
partner (0.0217) (0.0247) (0.0217) (0.0206) 
working 0.0454* 0.2699*** 0.0454* 0.3121*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0440) (0.0221) (0.0445) 
years of education 0.0230* 0.0549*** 0.0230* 0.0705*** 
 (0.0124) (0.0157) (0.0124) (0.0202) 
chronic diseases 0.0222** -0.1278*** 0.0222** -0.1846*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0155) (0.0095) (0.0145) 
log of equivalised -0.0070 0.0643*** -0.0070 0.0610*** 
household income (0.0084) (0.0123) (0.0084) (0.0129) 
home ownership -0.0046 0.1379*** -0.0046 0.1642*** 
 (0. 0205) (0.0262 ) (0.0205) (0.0254) 
Instruments:     
normal retirement 0.0765***  0.0765***  
minus age (0.0055)  (0.0055)  
government net -0.0982***  -0.0982***  
lending (0.0272)  (0.0272)  
F-test: pension 99.295  95.603  
insecurity     
Durbin-Wu-Hausman 27.300 (p = 0.0001) 
5.6444 (p = 
0.0295) 
test     
Partial R2 0.221  0.222  
Over-identification test 0.535 (p = 0.464) 
1.47726 (p = 
0.2242) 
(Sargan)     
constant -0.7054*** -0.3320*** -0.7054*** -0.1443** 
 ( 0 . 1760 ) (0.1011) (0.1760) (0 . 0642) 
N 15,389 15,389 15,389 15,124 
R2 0.221 0.153 0.221 0.199 
Year and country dummies are included. Pension insecurity is the first component of a PCA of both chances of pension 
changes in the future. All variables, except dummies, are standardised with mean zero and SD equal to one. Robust 
clustered (by country) errors are in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Instrumental variables 
Table 9 shows the results of the IV regressions for life satisfaction and the eudemonic wellbeing measure. 
The results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test at the bottom of Table 9 indicate that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that pension insecurity is exogenous. Therefore, the IV estimates can be rated as more efficient 
than the OLS estimates. The F-statistic is considerably larger than the rule of thumb of 10 (Stock et al., 
2002) and confirms the strength of our instruments. The over-identification test assesses if the instruments 
are invalid instruments and whether the structural equation is incorrectly specified. In both sets of 
dependent variables, the results of the Sargan and Barman tests (although the last one is not reported) are 
statistically not significant and, therefore, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our instruments are valid. 
In addition, in the first stage, we find the expected results of the instruments on pension insecurity: i) the 
variable retirement age minus age is positively correlated with pension insecurity, and ii) a deterioration of 
public finances is correlated with an increase of pension insecurity. Importantly, the effect of pension 
insecurity on subjective wellbeing is significant and negative. This effect is -0.187 SD and -0.162 SD for the 
life satisfaction and the eudemonic wellbeing measure, respectively.
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Conclusions 
This paper has proposed and explored a concept of pension insecurity as a specific form of economic 
insecurity suffered by individuals who, being at advanced stages of the life-cycle, will not have enough time 
to adequately respond to an adverse policy change in pension rules. In particular, we investigate how 
pension insecurity is connected to subjective wellbeing in a European population. We claim that pension 
insecurity decreases life satisfaction of the individuals who are approaching retirement, which is 
exacerbated by unfavourable economic conditions. Indeed, opinion survey data show that worries about 
pensions increased after the economic crisis. Our results are in line with current research focussed on 
studying the effects of the economic crisis on retirement behaviour. Our findings reveal that the individuals 
who are more affected by pension insecurity are those who are further away from their retirement, have 
lower income, assess their life survival as low, have higher cognitive abilities and do not expect private 
pension payments. These results also hold under a variety of robustness checks. The IV estimations allow 
us to exploit the external variation of pension regulations and public finance conditions per country and 
year, and through this channel we can claim that pension insecurity is influencing wellbeing and not the 
other way around. 
An important result is that life satisfaction is most negatively affected among poor groups. The reason is that 
these groups have lower savings or other forms of wealth that could protect them from future reductions of 
pensions. Thus, the policy changes toward reducing pensions or increasing retirement ages do affect lower 
income groups more than others. In addition, our results indicate that private pensions insulate higher 
income groups from dependencies on public policy changes. All of these suggest that pension policy 
changes may exacerbate socio-economic differences among elderly individuals. 
We conclude that pension insecurity is another form of economic insecurity, which depends on the 
individual variation of resources as well as on economic conditions and eventually on the abilities of 
governments to balance these factors. This is salient for younger seniors today due to the recent crisis and 
its aftermaths, but it will also be important for the retirement of coming cohorts. What was known for 
decades suddenly became an emergency situation in the course of the crisis. While some countries 
launched stimuli to overcome the crisis immediately, e.g. Australia and Sweden, other countries changed 
from expansion to retrenchment (Starke et al., 2014). Hence, the reactions to economic crises will probably 
depend on the sustainability of social expenditure. The funding of pension systems will be an issue for the 
near future, and they are under revision in many European countries. However, with the rise of private 
pension systems, provisions could be increasingly dependent on market forces which could reinforce 
pension insecurity in the long run and reflect socioeconomic inequalities in the society. 
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Notes 
1. The figures about the confidence in pensions are drawn from a question that is only asked in the 
Eurobarometer rounds of 2006 and 2009: ‘At the moment, when you think of the future of your pension, 
would you say that you are very confident / somewhat confident / not very confident / not at all 
confident?'.  
2. We use the releases 2.6.0 and 1.1.1 for waves 2 and 4, respectively. Detailed information about 
SHARE and its methodology can be found in: http://www.share-project.org/. 
3. The first component of the PCA is adjusted to lie between 0 and 1 in order to ease the comparability 
with the two questions about pension insecurity. 
4. The following tables only report the regressions with the variable of pension insecurity. The regression 
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results that separately employ each item of pension insecurity are available from the authors upon 
request. 
5. We have used the statutory retirement age in each country for every individual (see Table A1 of the 
Appendix). 
6. See Mazzonna and Peracchi (2012) for a detailed description of cognitive measures in SHARE. 
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Appendix 
TABLE A1: Normal and early statutory retirement age (2007 and 2012) 
 Females  males 
 2007  2012  2007  2012 
 normal early  normal early  Normal early  normal early 
Country ret. ret.  ret. ret.  ret. ret.  ret. ret. 
Austria 60.0 60.0  60.0 60.0  65.0 62.0  65.0 62.0 
Germany 65.0 63.0  65.1 63.0  65.0 63.0  65.1 63.0 
Sweden 65.0 61.0  65.0 61.0  65.0 61.0  65.0 61.0 
Netherlands 65.0 65.0  65.0 65.0  65.0 65.0  65.0 65.0 
Spain 65.0 61.0  65.0 63.0  65.0 61.0  65.0 63.0 
Italy 60.0 57.0  62.0 62.0  65.0 60.0  66.0 62.0 
France 60.0 57.0  65.0 60.0  60.0 57.0  65.0 60.0 
Denmark 65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0 
Greece 60.0 55.0  63.5 62.0  65.0 55.0  65.0 62.0 
Switzerland 64.0 62.0  64.0 62.0  65.0 63.0  65.0 63.0 
Belgium 65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0  65.0 60.0 
Czech Rep. 61.0 58.0  61.0 60.0  63.0 60.0  63.0 60.0 
Poland 60.0 60.0  60.0 60.0  65.0 65.0  65.0 65.0 
Ireland 65.0 65.0  66.0 66.0  65.0 65.0  66.0 66.0 
Hungary 62.0 57.0  63.5 59.0  62.0 60.0  63.5 60.0 
Portugal 65.0 55.0  65.0 55.0  65.0 55.0  65.0 55.0 
Slovenia 61.0 58.0  61.0 58.0  63.0 58.0  63.0 58.0 
Estonia 60.5 57.5  61.0 58.0  63.0 60.0  63.0 60.0 
Source: OECD (2007), OECD (2011), OECD (2013), OECD (2014). European Commission (2009). 
